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A REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CONSTRUCTION
TRUST STATUTE DECISIONS IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF MARYLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND
David F. Albright, Jr. t

INTRODUCTION
In 1987 the Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute entitled
"Trust Relationships in the Construction Industry"· (the "construction trust statute"). Designed to complement the Maryland Mechanics' Liens Statute,2 the construction trust statute designates that
money received by a contractor or subcontractor on a construction
project constitutes a trust fund for the payment of amounts owed
to lower-tiered subcontractors. 3 Section 9-202 states that "[a]ny officer, director or employee ... who, with intent to defraud, retains
or uses" the trust funds "for any purpose other than to pay" lowertiered subcontractors is "personally liable to any person damaged . . . ."4 Significantly, the construction trust statute permits the
I.

t B.A., 1978, Harvard University; J.D., 1981, Georgetown University Law
Center; Partner, Horn & Bennett, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland ..
1. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-201 to -204 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
2. Id. §§ 9-101 to -114. See generally, David F. Albright, Jr., The Maryland
Construction Trust Statute: New Personal Liability - Its Scope and Federal
Bankruptcy Implications, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 482, 482-83 (1988) (reviewing
Maryland's Mechanics' Liens Statute).
3. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Moneys to be held in trust. - Any moneys paid under a contract
by an owner to a contractor, or by the owner or contractor to a
subcontractor for work done or materials furnished, or both, for or
about a building by any subcontractor, shall be held in trust by the
contractor or subcontractor, as trustee, for those subcontractors who
did work or furnished materials, or both, for or about the building,
for purposes of paying those subcontractors.
Id.
·4. Id. § 9-202. The statute provides the following:
Any officer, director, or employee of any contractor or subcontractor, who, with intent to defraud, retains or uses the moneys held
in trust under § 9-201 of this subtitle, or any part thereof, for any
purpose other than to pay those subcontractors for whom the moneys
are held in trust, shall be personally liable to any person damaged by
the action.
Id.
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subcontractor to prove a prima facie case of an intent to defraud
merely by proving that the trust funds have been diverted. s
In 1988, my first commentary on the construction trust statute6
addressed the issues regarding the personal liability and the bankruptcy implications of individuals diverting trust funds. 7 At the time
the commentary was written, no court decisions had been rendered
regarding the newly enacted construction trust statute. Five years
later, both the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland provided substantial
guidance to the practitioner.
This Article outlines the guidance the courts sitting in Maryland
have provided. Specifically, this Article analyzes the court of appeals'
decision in Ferguson Trenching Co. v. Kiehne,s which addressed the
definition of "intent to defraud" in the context of the construction
trust statute. 9 This Article then discusses several bankruptcy court
decisions that have interpreted the interplay between the construction
trust statute and the Bankruptcy Code. These bankruptcy decisions
address dischargeability, proof of fraud, and the effect of a state
court judgment in the context of a debtor's discharge.
II. "INTENT TO DEFRAUD": DEFINITION AND
PERMISSIBLE EVIDENCE UNDER FERGUSON
The court of appeals' first construed the construction trust
statute in Ferguson Trenching Co. v. Kiehne.lO Ferguson defines
"intent to defraud" under the statute and also provides guidance as
to the type of evidence that the trier of fact may consider in
determining whether an "intent to defraud" exists. In addition, the
court of appeals inconclusively addressed in dicta the burden of proof
in diversion of trust fund cases, thereby requiring future clarification
by the court.
In Ferguson, a subcontractor sought to impose personal liability
upon the president of a general contractor for the diversion of trust
5. [d. § 9-203. The statute provides that

[t]he use by any contractor or subcontractor or any officer, director,
or employee of a contractor or subcontractor of any moneys held in
trust under § 9-201 of this subtitle, for any other purpose than to
pay those subcontractors who did work or furnished materials, or
both, for or about the building, shall be prima facie evidence of intent
to defraud in a civil action.
[d.

6. Albright, supra note 2.
7. [d. at 485-503.
8. 329 Md. 169, 618 A.2d 735 (1993).
9. [d. at 183-87, 618 A.2d at 741-44.
10. 329 Md. 169, 618 A.2d 735 (1993).
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funds. 1I The subcontractor, who performed work at the request of
the general contractor for a real estate development, claimed that it
was owed $44,549Y The general contractor admitted that approximately $45,000 of the funds which it received on the project were
used for "the payment of debts incurred in connection with other
construction projects" and "operating expenses. "13 The subcontractor
obtained a judgment against the general contractor, and thereafter
filed suit against the general contractor's president, alleging a violation of the construction trust statute. 14
The trial court found that the subcontractor did not demonstrate
that he was intentionally defrauded by the contractor. IS The trial
judge noted that the general contractor was experiencing financial
difficulty due to both bad management and the severe decline in the
industry as a whole, offering a possible alternative explanation for
his diversion of the funds. 16 The subcontractor appealed, and the
court of appeals granted certiorari before the court of special appeals
could consider the case. 11
The subcontractor raised two primary arguments on appeal.
First, the subcontractor argued that both the general contractor, as
a corporate entity, and the president of the general contractor owed
a fiduciary duty to the subcontractor .18 Second, the subcontractor
claimed that the trial court failed to apply correctly the presumption
of prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud set forth in section
9-203 of the construction trust statute. 19
In rejecting the subcontractor's first argument, the court of
appeals focused upon the plain language of the statute. The court
noted that under the construction trust statute the contracting entity,
not the individual officers, directors or employees, is the trustee of
the funds. 20 According to the court, nothing in the construction trust

II. [d. at 172, 618 A.2d at 736.
12. [d.
13. [d.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 174, 618 A.2d at 737.
at 173, 618 A.2d at 737.
at 174, 618 A.2d at 737.

at 177,618 A.2d at 739. The statute specifies that the funds "shall be held
in trust by the contractor." MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201(a) (1988 &
Supp. 1992). The term "contractor" means the "person who has a contract
with an owner." [d. § 9-101(d). "Person" includes a "private corporation."
[d. § I-I01(j). The court contrasted Maryland's statute with those from other
jurisdictions which specifically impose fiduciary status upon corporate officers.
Ferguson, 329 Md. at 178-79, 618 A.2d at 739-40 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, § 153(3) (West 1990) & TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.002 (West 1984».
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statute indicates that individual officers, directors or employees are
fiduciaries of the lower-tiered subcontractors. 21 The court further
stated that the fiduciary duties established under section 9-201 of the
construction trust statute "are imposed only on the party to the
contract. "22 Therefore, fiduciary status is imposed only upon the
corporate general contractor, not on its officers, directors or employees.
Second, the subcontractor contended that under section 9-203
of the construction trust statute proof of diversion of trust funds
was not merely evidence of an intent to defraud, but conclusive
proof of an intent to defraud. 23 The court of appeals summarily
rejected this second argument, stating that no authority supported
the subcontractor's proposition that prima facie evidence under section 9-203 constitutes an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption. 24
The court recognized, however, that there is room for disagreement
as to the precise meaning of prima facie evidence. 2s Citing a well
regarded Maryland treatise on evidence, the court outlined the following possible interpretations:
The term "prima facie evidence" is sometimes used to mean
"compelling evidence," i.e., evidence which shifts the burden of production to the opposing party, and thus to signify
a true evidentiary rebuttable presumption. It is also used to
mean "sufficient evidence" to get to the jury, i.e., merely
that the party with the burden of persuasion has met the
burden of production and created an issue for the trier of
fact by giving rise to a permissible inference. 26
While the court stated that it need not choose between these
approaches in order to reject the subcontractor's interpretation,27
Judge Chasanow, writing for the court, indicated in dicta that even
the "sufficient evidence" approach was enough to rebuke the subcontractor's contention that anything short of a "conclusive proof"
interpretation renders the prima facie clause of the statute super flu-

21. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 177, 618 A.2d at 739. While § 9-202 of the construction
trust statute imposes liability upon officers, directors, or employees of any
contractor, MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-202 (1988 & Supp. 1992), fiduciary
status is imposed by the preceding section of the statute. See id. § 9-201(a).
22. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 178, 618 A.2d at 739.
23. [d. at 179-80, 618 A.2d at 740.
24. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 741.
25. [d. at 182, 618 A.2d at 741.
26. [d. (quoting LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 301.4,
at 230-31 (1987) (footnotes omitted».
27. [d.
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OUS.28 The court declined the opportunity, however, to decide whether
prima facie evidence in the context of the construction trust statute
means "compelling evidence" or merely "sufficient evidence."29
Thus, the court of appeals left open the question of whether
proof of diversion of trust funds under section 9-203 of the construction trust statute merely allows the plaintiff to survive a motion for
judgment absent other evidence of an intent to defraud, or whether
such proof actually shifts the burden of production to the defendant.
This issue of whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden
of production may be significant in light of the evidence which the
defendant has in a particular case. If the burden of production of
evidence is shifted to the defendant, not only would the plaintiff
survive a motion for judgment, but the defendant would also be
required to produce"evidence in his defense in order to preclude the
granting of a motion for judgment in favor of the plaintiff or a"
preemptory jury instruction in favor of the plaintiff. 30
Regardless of the resolution of this specific burden of production
issue, the court concluded that proof of a diversion of trust funds
does not constitute conclusive evidence of an intent to defraud. 31 The
court stated that a defendant may introduce evidence to convince the
trier of fact that he or she did not act with the intent to defraud. 32
The court defined "intent to defraud" as "some form of bad faith
by the defendant ... ," and stated that "the defendant must act
dishonestly or at least with reckless indifference. "33 The court stated
that the decision of the trial court was not clearly erroneous because
it could have found the following facts, anyone of which might
have negated an intent to defraud:
(1) all contract funds were devoted to legitimate business
debts and expenses of [the general contractor]; (2) [the"
1992)

28. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742. The court stated that "[u)nder the statute, proof

of the diversion of funds allows a plaintiff's case to reach the fact finder
without the plaintiff otherwise having to prove the defendant's intent to
defraud." [d. While this preceding statement seems to embrace the concept of
"sufficient evidence" with regard to the construction trust statute, the court
made it clear that it was leaving the decision to choose between "sufficient
evidence" and "compelling evidence" for another day. [d. at 182, 618 A.2d
at 742. A better interpretation, therefore, is that the court was simply illustrating
that even the lesser "sufficient evidence" interpretation is enough to counter
the plaintiff's charge that anything short of a "conclusive proof" interpretation
renders the language of the statute meaningless.
29. [d.

30. LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 300.6, at 171
(1987).
31. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 182, 618 A.2d at 742.
32. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742.
33. [d. at 184, 618 A.2d at 742 (citing Everett v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 307 Md.
286, 300, 513 A.2d 882, 889 (1986».
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general contractor] was undergoing severe financial hardship
... ; (3) [the general contractor] was from 90 to 120 days
behind on its payments to creditors; (4) [the general contractor] suffered a net loss of over $200,000 in 1989; (5)
[the president of the general contractor] consulted with an
attorney about a possible Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing; (6)
an amount nearly equal to the amount [the general contractor] owed to [the subcontractor] was still owed [by the
owner to the general contractor]; (7) [the president of the
general contractor] invested a large amount of his own
money ... to keep [the general contractor] in business; and
(8) [the president of the general contractor] fully intended
to pay [the subcontractor's] invoice, but [the general contractor's] cash collections fell short of projections. 34
Therefore, the court concluded that enough evidence was presented
to enable the trial court to find that the president of the general
contractor "genuinely believed" that the general contractor would
be able to pay the subcontractor the money it was owed "within a
reasonable time" out of the general contractor's "anticipated future
income.' '35
Consequently, the court of appeals in Ferguson significantly
clarified definitional and evidentiary issues regarding the construction
trust statute. The court defined "intent to defraud" as bad faith
evidenced by dishonesty or reckless indifference; it also indicated
what type of evidence a defendant may introduce to rebut prima
facie evidence of an intent to defraud. The court, however, did not
take the opportunity to construe the scope of the personal liability
provision, stating instead that the prima facie clause in the statute
merely gives the plaintiff "an important evidentiary boost. "36 Furthermore, the Ferguson decision did not resolve the question of the
precise meaning and effect of prima facie evidence of an intent to
defraud under section 9-203 of Maryland's construction trust statute.
III. FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW: ATTEMPTED
NARROWING OF THE EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE UNDER
SECTION 523(a)(4).

A.

Dischargeabi/i ty
As indicated in my first commentary on the construction trust
statute, an important issue exists as to whether a debt arising under
34. [d. at 187, 618 A.2d at 743-44.
35. [d. at 187, 618 A.2d at 744.
36. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742. In my first commentary, I argued that the court
would probably construe the scope of the personal liability provision broadly.
Albright, supra note 2, at 485-93. The focus of that discussion, however, was
the type of actions which would expose individuals to liability. Therefore, the
scope of the personal liability provisions remains unresolved.
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the statute would be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 37 Section
523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge a debt
arising from fraud or defalcation of the debtor in the context of a
fiduciary relationship.38 Although decisions from other jurisdictions
indicate that a debt arising from construction trust statutes similar
to Maryland's would be nondischargeable,39 two of the judges on
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland in
two separate opinions have now ruled in favor of the debtor, holding
that debt arising from the construction trust statute is dischargeable.
In re MarinlfO addressed the dischargeability of a debt incurred
as a result of the application of the construction trust statute. In
Marino, the debtor was an officer, director, employee and sole
shareholder of a contracting company.41 The debtor's corporation
acted as the general contractor on two custom homebuilding projects. 42 After failing to pay subcontractors out of the funds received
from the homeowners, the debtor and his wife filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 43 Both the homeowners and subcontractors alleged that certain debts were nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4) because of the debtor's breach of
the construction trust statute. 44
Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the nondischargeability of debt when fraud or defalcation occurs while the
debtor is acting in a fiduciary capacity.4S Judge Derby correctly noted
that under the Maryland construction trust statute a trust is created
in favor of the subcontractors, not in favor of the homeowners.46
The inquiry regarding the subcontractor's challenge to dischargeability must then proceed by determining if the Maryland construction
trust statute creates fiduciary obligations of the type contemplated
by section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy CodeY
The fiduciary capacity requirement of section 523(a)(4) is satisfied if a technical trust is in existence at the time of the defalcation. 48

37. [d. at 493-501.
38. Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[aJ discharge ...
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt - ... for fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity .... " 11 V .S.C. § 523(a)(4)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
39. See Albright, supra note 2, at 494-501 (cataloguing the states holding that
debts arising under construction trust statutes are nondischargeable).
40. 115 B.R. 863 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
41. [d. at 865.
42. [d.
43. [d.
44. [d. at 866.

45. 11 V.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991).

46. Marino, 115 B.R. at 869.
47. [d. at 867-69.
48. [d. at 868.
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Furthermore, the fiduciary relationship must be independent from
the transaction giving rise to the debt. 49 Judge Derby held that the
Maryland statute creates an express trust. 50 Nevertheless, Judge Derby
found that the trust created by the statute would be ex maleficio and
not a technical trust in existence. 51 Therefore, according to Judge
Derby, the trust created by the construction trust statute does not
establish the fiduciary capacity necessary to sustain a claim of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy CodeY
In my previous commentary, 53 I argued that the Maryland statute
was distinguishable from a similar Texas statute because of Maryland's explicit reference that a diversion of funds would constitute
prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. 54 As a result, I argued
that In re Boyle,55 which construed the Texas statute and held that
the diverter's debt would be nondischargeable, would not be persuasive to a court addressing dischargeability with respect to Maryland
law. 56 In contrast to my argument that Boyle would not be persuasive,
Judge Derby cited this Texas opinion with favor, and suggested that
these two statutes are in fact the same with respect to dischargeability
under section 523(a)(4) because both create fiduciary relationships ex

maleficio. 57
Judge Schneider of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Maryland took a position similar to that taken by Judge Derby, by
denying the use of section 9-203 of the construction trust statute to
prove fraud in the case of In re Holmes. 58 While Judge Schneider
agreed that the Maryland statute creates a trust ex maleficio, he
disagreed with Judge Derby's opinion that the construction trust
statute creates an express trust. 59 In Holmes, Judge Schneider concluded that the creation of an express trust depends on the intention
of the parties; therefore, an express trust can never be created by
statute alone. 60 Judge Schneider's conclusion is consistent with the
generally accepted theory of contracts which holds that a statute can

49.Id.
50. Id. at 869. Judge Schneider, in a subsequent opinion, disagreed with Judge
Derby's assessment that the Maryland statute creates an express trust. See infra
note 58 and accompanying text.
51. Marino, 115 B.R. at 872.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 2.
54. Albright, supra note 2, at 500.
55. 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987).
56. Albright, supra note 2, at 500.
57. In re Marino, 115 B.R. 863, 872 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
58. 117 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
59. Id. at 852.
60. Id. at 853.
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never create a contract implied in law; such a statute merely creates
quasi-contractual rights. 61

Proof of Fraud
The interpretation of the presumption contained in section 9-203
of the construction trust statute 62 became an issue in a later decision
involving the same debtor as in the first Marino case.63 Like the
court of appeals in Ferguson. the bankruptcy court held that the
statutory presumption in section 9-203 of the construction trust
statute alone was not sufficient to establish fraud under section
523(a)(4).64
In the second Marino case. the creditor moved for summary
judgment on its complaint excepting to the dischargeability of the
debt arising under section 523(a)(4).6S The creditor argued that proof
of diversion of trust funds raises a statutory presumption of an intent
to defraud under section 9-203 of the construction trust statute.
thereby entitling the creditor to the grant of summary judgment. 66
Judge Derby disagreed and held that a creditor proceeding under
section 523(a)(4) must prove "fraud in fact" and not merely "fraud
in law. "67 Mere proof of diversion of trust funds. although constituting "fraud in law" under section 9-203 of the construction trust
statute. does not constitute "fraud in fact. "68 To prove "fraud in
fact:' a creditor must show that "positive. immoral acts were in
fact conducted. "69 Accordingly. the creditor's motion for summary
judgment was denied. 70
Based upon the second Marino case. it is clear that plaintiffs
and creditors alike will not be able to rely on the existence of prima
facie evidence in a case involving the construction trust statute. For
all practical purposes. additional evidence of an intent to defraud
must exist if a plaintiff is to prevail. or if a creditor is to succeed
in seeking a denial of discharge in bankruptcy.
B.

61. See JOHN D. CALAMA1U & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 112 (3d ed. 1987) ("A contract implied in law is not a contract at all but an
obligation imposed by law to do justice even though it is clear that no promise
was ever made or intended. ").
62. Section 9-203 provides that the improper use of moneys held in trust under
§ 9-201 shall constitute prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. MD. CODE
ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-203 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
63. In re Marino, 139 B.R. 380 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
64. Id. at 385.
65. Id. at 381.
66.Id.
67. Id. at 383.
68.Id.
69.Id.
70. Id. at 385.
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Effect of State Court Judgments

Another issue that has arisen on two occasions in Maryland's
bankruptcy courts involves the effect of a state court judgment under
the construction trust statute on a debtor's discharge pursuant to
section S23(a)(4). In In re Parks,7l Judge Friend, sitting by designation, held that a state· court judgment against an individual debtor
under the construction trust statute constituted collateral estoppel
with regard to the creditor's complaint objecting to discharge under
section S23(a)(4).72 In the state court proceeding, the creditor moved
for summary judgment against the debtor; the state court entered
summary judgment after the debtor failed to oppose the motion. 73
Approximately one year later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and
the creditor initiated an adversary proceeding to have the debt
declared nondischargeable. 74 The creditor filed a motion for summary
judgment in the adversary proceeding, contending that the state court
judgment collaterally estopped the debtor from raising the issue of
the nondischargeability of the debt. 75 Judge Friend granted the creditor's motion, finding that the bankruptcy court was bound by the
state court judgment. 76
Faced with a similar factual situation, Judge Derby distinguished
the Parks decision. In re Piercy77 involved a creditor who had
obtained a state court judgment against the debtor under the construction trust statute. 78 Judge Derby found that the state court's
judgment had no collateral estoppel effect because it was uncontested
and the creditor had not moved for summary judgment.79 In granting
the debtor's motion for summary jUdgment, Judge Derby reiterated
that fraud under section S23(a)(4) requires "positive fraud or fraud
in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong. "80 Accordingly, a finding of fraud under section 9-203 of the construction
trust statute was insufficient to support a finding of fraud under
section S23(a)(4).8l
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently clarified how
the phrase "intent to defraud" should be interpreted within the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

141 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
[d. at 93.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
140 B.R. 108 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
[d. at ItO.
[d. at 1l3.
[d. at 114.
[d.
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meaning of the construction trust statute. While not precisely addressing the meaning of prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud,
the court of appeals indicated how a defendant may rebut prima
facie evidence of an intent to defraud.
In the five years since the construction trust statute was enacted,
the federal bankruptcy judges sitting in Maryland have circumscribed
the use of the construction trust statute with respect to the dischargeability of debts. In particular, the bankruptcy judges in this district
have not approved the use of section 9-203 of the construction trust
statute to prove fraud under section S23(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code.

